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ABStrAct
Because of the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy, 
the role of the European commission in EU external action is 
often considered minimal or residual. Providing a systematic 
review of the case of Kosovo, this paper demonstrates that it is 
possible to identify different degrees of integration in EU foreign 
policy. It does so by investigating under which conditions 
Member States delegate foreign policy competences to the 
commission. In the case of Kosovo, integration in EU foreign 
policy has been conditioned by the level of control Member 
States have chosen exercise on or delegate to supranational 
institutions.
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Beyond the Intergovernmental-Supranational 
Divide in EU Foreign Policy: Insights from Kosovo
by Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré*
Introduction
the common Foreign and Security Policy and the common Security and 
Defence Policy (cSDP) are generally considered as the areas in which Member 
States entirely maintain their sovereign decision-making powers. In this regard, 
Fabbrini highlights the presence of different Unions, namely a supranational 
and an intergovernmental one.1 the latter “has been the answer for the need to 
advance integration in the crucial foreign and security policies.”2 Because of the 
intergovernmental nature of cSDP, the role of the European commission in EU 
external action is often considered minimal or residual. Scholars such as Puetter, 
Stacey, Dinan and Mèrand et al. argue that the Lisbon treaty has further weakened 
the position of the European commission in EU Foreign Policy.3
1 Sergio Fabbrini, Compound Democracies. Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming 
Similar, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; Sergio Fabbrini, “Intergovernmentalism and Its 
Limits: Assessing the European Union’s Answer to the Euro crisis”, in Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 46, No. 9 (2013), p. 1003-1029; Sergio Fabbrini, “the European Union and the Libyan 
crisis”, in International Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March 2014), p. 177-195.
2 Sergio Fabbrini, “the European Union and the Libyan crisis”, cit., p. 182.
3 Uwe Puetter, “the Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: the treaty of Lisbon and 
Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy coordination”, in Paul James 
cardwell (ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, the Hague, t.M.c Asser 
Press, 2012, p. 17-34; Jeffrey Stacey, “Informal Governance in the EU: the European commission 
versus the European Parliament”, in thomas christiansen and christine Neuhold (eds.), 
International Handbook of Informal Governance, cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 395-411; 
Desmond Dinan, “Governance and Institutions: Implementing the Lisbon treaty in the Shadow of 
the Euro crisis”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, Suppl. 1 (September 2011), p. 103-
121; Frédéric Mérand, Stéphanie c. Hofmann and Bastien Irondelle, “Governance and State Power: 
A Network Analysis of European Security”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1 
(January 2011), p. 121-147.
* Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré is PhD researcher in Political Sciences, Department of Political 
Sciences, LUISS Guido carli University. E-mail: mamadio@luiss.it.
. Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), January 2015.
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this paper questions this mainstream view It does so by investigating under which 
conditions Member States delegate foreign policy competences to the commission. 
In particular, I hypothesise that different degrees of integration between the 
commission, considered as the supranational engine of the EU, and the Member 
States can and do occur. Such integration is determined in turn, by the level of 
control Member States exercise on the commission acting under the authority of 
the High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in her role as Vice 
President of such institution.
the paper begins by outlining the analytical model used to explain the delegation 
of competences to the commission. Subsequently, it delineates the historical, 
economic and institutional context, which provided fertile ground for an 
alignment of preferences among the different actors in EU foreign policy. As said, 
such alignment allowed for a delegation of competences and thus for integration 
to take place in the pre-Lisbon era. Finally, the paper will demonstrate how the 
same alignment of preferences has been present also in the aftermath of the 
Lisbon treaty. In the case of Kosovo, and in particular in the lead-up to the Brussels 
agreement, an alignment of preferences provided the same favourable context for 
Member States to delegate external action competences to the reshaped figure of 
the High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President 
of the commission (Hr/VP), assisted by the newly established European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the commission itself.
1. Integration and the Principal Agent model. Insights on the case 
of Kosovo
the stabilisation of Kosovo remains a challenge. Among the problems to be solved 
policy analysts and practitioners identify corruption, organised crime and the 
refusal of Serbs living in northern Kosovo to recognise Kosovar authorities.4 Yet, 
it is undeniable that the Balkan countries have been facing triple transitions in 
the past decade: from war to peace, from a communist-command economy to a 
liberal market economy and from a single-party rule to a pluralist democracy.5 
Notwithstanding the divisions regarding the status of Kosovo, the EU, as a whole, 
is willing to play a pivotal role in supporting such systemic transformations.
the Western Balkans area has long been particularly important to the EU, and the 
prospect of enlargement to such region, formalised in 2003, represents the key 
policy framework for engagement with the region. As pointed out by christopher 
Hill in 1993, the EU had prime responsibility to act as a “regional pacifier” and 
4 See, for instance, European council for Foreign relations (EcFr), European Foreign Policy 
Scorecard of 2010/11, 2012, 2013; 2014, http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard.
5 rosa Balfour and corina Stratulat, “the democratic transformation of the Balkans”, in EPC Issue 
Papers, No. 66 (November 2011), http://www.epc.eu/pub_details?cat_id=2&pub_id=1363.
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conflict mediator in the Balkans.6 As Gross and rotta point out, the “Western Balkans 
represents the only theatre of activity where the EU explicitly claims a political and 
operational lead in a dense international field where the EU, NAtO, and the US 
work towards common goals.”7 Yet it is only since NAtO’s intervention in Kosovo in 
1999 that the EU has played an increasingly important role in the region, well aware 
that the EU could not afford another foreign policy failure in its backyard. Whilst 
the Union was unable to prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict in this territory, 
it did prove capable of dealing with post-conflict economic reconstruction within 
the framework of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and through economic aid.8 With regard to the latter, the EU provided 
more than 2 billion euro in aid to Kosovo, roughly two-thirds of the sum provided 
by the international community.9
Such unity of purpose over the stabilisation of Kosovo between Member States 
and the commission has created fertile ground for instances of delegation of 
competences from the former to the latter. According to the Principal Agent 
model, collective agents – Member States – prefer not to delegate competences 
in delicate policy areas, such as foreign policy.10 this is because in cases of non-
aligned preferences between actors, any policy chosen by the executive agent – 
in this case the commission – would lead to an outcome inevitably distant from 
the ideal point of the principal – the Member States. Yet, in certain conditions, 
principals might choose to delegate.11 Franchino highlights that delegation might 
be convenient for Member States in order to reduce the amount of work or to 
face technically complex matters.12 Whereas, Fiorina points out that delegation 
might also serve as a successful tool for “blame shifting”13 whenever unpopular 
6 christopher Hill, “the capability-Expectations Gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s International 
role”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 305-328.
7 Eva Gross and Alessandro rotta, “the EEAS and the Western Balkans”, in IAI Working Papers, No. 
11|15 (June 2011), p. 2, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1115.pdf.
8 Isabel Lirola Delgado, “the European Union and Kosovo in the Light of the territorial Issue”, in 
Peter Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo and International Law. The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, Leiden, 
Nijhoff, 2012, p. 157-180.
9 Stefano Valentino, “cold case: EU spending in Kosovo”, in European Voice, 7 July 2011, http://
www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=16120.
10 Mattia Guidi, “Delegation and Varieties of capitalism: Explaining the Independence of National 
competition Agencies in the European Union”, in Comparative European Politics, Vol. 12, No. 
3 (May 2014), p. 343-365; Stephen A. ross, “the Economic theory of Agency: the Principal’s 
Problem”, in The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1973), p. 134-139, https://www.aeaweb.
org/aer/top20/63.2.134-139.pdf; Gary J. Miller, “the Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models”, 
in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2005), p. 203-225.
11 Mattia Guidi, “Delegation and Varieties of capitalism”, cit.
12 Fabio Franchino, “Efficiency or credibility? testing the two logics of delegation to the European 
commission”, in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 5 (October 2002), p. 677-694, http://
users2.unimi.it/fabiofranchino/wp-content/uploads/Article%20downloads/JEPP%202002/
Franchino_JEPP_2002.pdf.
13 Morris P. Fiorina, “Legislative choice of regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
Process?”, in Public Choice, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1982), p. 33-66.
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measures need to be adopted.14 In the case of the five non-recognisers of Kosovo’s 
independence, participating in or not obstructing commission action could be 
interpreted as a form of “blame shifting”, insofar as it would allow them to take part 
in the stabilisation of the Balkans without having to recognise Kosovo.
In the case of Kosovo, the policy preferences of the Member States and the 
commission have been close ever since the first phases of the post-conflict 
reconstruction of the country. As such, Member States have been keen on delegating 
to the commission. Indeed, in Kosovo, most EU policies have been conducted by 
the commission with the political and financial support of the Member States. 
Kosovo’s path towards integration has been largely managed by the commission 
through the establishment and monitoring of instruments such as the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP), the Stabilisation and Association Process tracking 
Mechanism (StM) and the European Partnership for Kosovo. Last but not least, 
the largest EU cSDP mission, both in size and scope, was deployed in Kosovo, 
with the unanimous approval of all Member States. Likewise, normalisation of 
the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade has been constantly linked to EU 
enlargement policy. Interestingly, such an alignment of preferences occurred 
notwithstanding the divisions among Member States on the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence.
2. From post-conflict reconstruction to European integration: 
What role for the commission?
2.1 From post-conflict reconstruction to enlargement
the commission’s expertise was crucial in supporting reforms in Kosovo, especially 
in the first phase of economic institution building. the commission contributed to 
the work of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, headed 
by the Special representative of the UN Secretary-General (SrSG) and comprised 
of four different components called “Pillars”.15 Such pillars were directed by Deputy 
SrSGs and sustained by other organisations. Pillar I originally coordinated refugee 
return under the guidance of the UN refugee Agency (UNHcr). Pillar II managed 
civil administration. Pillar III included the Organization of Security and co-operation 
in Europe (OScE) Mission in Kosovo and was responsible for democratisation and 
institution building. the fourth UNMIK Pillar, was, notably, referred to as the “EU 
Pillar”,16 and dealt with economic development. the EU’s contribution went beyond 
14 Mattia Guidi, “Delegation and Varieties of capitalism”, cit.
15 Michael Karnitschnig, “the United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo: the challenges 
of Joint Nation-Building”, in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister, tom ruys (eds.), The United Nations 
and the European Union: An ever stronger partnership, the Hague, t.M.c. Asser Press, 2006, p. 323-
351.
16 It is important to remember that UNMIK’s “EU Pillar” has never been an EU agent, for it is an 
integral part of a UN mission, but with financial input and political support from the EU.
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supporting financially UNMIK. EU institutions and Member States also provided 
experts to UNMIK and funded workers contracted locally.17 Moreover, from 2000, 
Kosovo became part of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Such policy 
envisages a wide range of tools, among which are trade preferences, financial 
assistance, contractual ties and policy advice. As EU membership is envisaged 
as the final goal of this process, the SAP entails far-reaching reforms on the rule 
of law, economic reforms and regional cooperation. trade also occupies a prime 
role in the process with the prospect of signing a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. the SAP’s second component,18 for instance, regards EU autonomous 
trade measures (AtMs) and provides unlimited and duty-free access to the EU of 
nearly all products originating in Kosovo. Such AtMs consider Kosovo as a separate 
customs territory, conducting its own trade policy independently from Serbia.19
In order to support Kosovo’s ongoing state building, the commission established 
further mechanisms as years went by. these included the Kosovo SAP tracking 
Mechanism and the European Partnership for Kosovo, inspired by the Accession 
Partnership used for the candidate countries.20 Kosovo has also been covered by pre-
accession assistance since 2007, aimed at bolstering institutional capacity, cross-
border cooperation, economic and social development and rural development.21
2.2 The declaration of independence and EU-Kosovo relations
On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia. 
In Brussels, the council recognised such declaration “underlin[ing] its conviction 
that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period of international 
administration under [UNSc resolution] 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis 
case.”22 Such uniqueness does not however call into question “the UN charter 
and the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and all UN Security council resolutions.”23 As a response, Serbia and 
17 Michael Karnitschnig, “the United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo”, cit.
18 the SAP components are: the contractual relationships (bilateral Stabilisation and Association 
agreements, SAA); trade relations (autonomous trade measures); financial assistance (the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, IPA); and regional cooperation and good neighbourly 
relations. See European commission, Enlargement policy Glossary: Stabilisation and Association 
Process, last updated 7 September 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/
sap_en.htm.
19 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “L’UE e i Balcani: l’impatto politico dell’Europa in Kosovo (Parte I)”, 
in Gli Euros, 5 May 2013, http://www.glieuros.eu/L-UE-e-i-Balcani-l-impatto,5986.html; Michael 
Karnitschnig, “the United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo”, cit.
20 Michael Karnitschnig, “the United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo”, cit.
21 IPA’s components are listed in the European commission website: How IPA works, last updated 4 
December 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/ipa/works_en.cfm.
22 council of the European Union, 2851st Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations, 
Brussels, 18 February 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
gena/98818.pdf.
23 Ibidem.
IA
I 
W
o
r
k
In
g
 p
A
p
e
r
s
 1
5
 |
 0
1 
- 
J
A
n
u
A
r
y
 2
0
15
7
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
Beyond the Intergovernmental-Supranational Divide 
in EU Foreign Policy: Insights from Kosovo
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
4
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-2
5
-5
russia protested, but France, Italy, Germany, the US and turkey supported Kosovo’s 
declaration. Of the 27 member states of the EU, 22 recognised Kosovo in 2008. three 
of the five EU states that have refused to do so were motivated in their rejection by 
the controversial status of their internal minorities. Whilst romania and Slovakia 
are worried about ethnic Hungarians, Spain has to deal with secessionist Basques 
and catalonians, the other two, Greece and the republic of cyprus are concerned 
about the prospects of northern cyprus’ secession. However, beyond the strictu 
sensu recognition of Kosovo, tied to domestic considerations, there has not been a 
visible cleavage between Member States on how to handle Kosovo’s transition.
Without EU support, the financial sustainability of Kosovo’s interim administration 
would have been unmanageable. Only six months after Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, a Donor conference was held on 11 July 2008, hosted by the 
commission in Brussels. Kosovar authorities had presented a Mid-term Expenditure 
Framework 2009-2011, which estimated a financial gap of 1.1 billion euro for 
Kosovo’s socio-economic development for the next three years. In response to the 
council’s demand to use community instruments to promote Kosovo’s economic 
and political development, a total of 1.2 billion euro was pledged by the international 
community, including 100 million euro for a stabilisation fund. the commission 
alone pledged 508 million euro, while EU Member States pledged 286 million euro 
from their bilateral assistance budgets.24 the commission’s organisation of the 
donor’s conference in response to the council’s request could be understood as a 
typical case of delegation from the Member States to their executive agent, against 
the background of an alignment of preferences between the two.
2.3 The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
the EU deployed a cSDP mission, which was de facto designed to supervise 
Kosovo’s independence.25 Notwithstanding the inability of Member States to 
reach a common position on the status of Kosovo, the deployment of the EU rule 
of Law Mission (EULEX) was nonetheless approved by all 27 Member States at the 
time. the format chosen – civilian operation – implied a considerable role for 
the commission in the implementation, the financing and the monitoring of the 
operation in the field.
Kosovo’s relevance for the EU is reflected also in the size and ambition of the EULEX. 
It is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and 
Defence Policy. At full strength, the mission was foreseen to have 1900 international 
24 EEAS, Kosovo and the EU. Political and economic relations, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm.
25 Giovanni Grevi, “EULEX Kosovo”, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), 
European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), Paris, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, 2009, p. 366, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/esdp-the-first-
10-years-1999-2009.
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staff and 1100 local staff.26 the mission had an all-encompassing operational 
mandate, aimed at assisting Kosovar authorities in the rule of law area. Indeed, it was 
the first fully integrated rule-of-law mission, embracing the fields of justice, police 
and customs. the centralisation of a spectrum of crucial horizontal responsibilities 
at the missions’ headquarters in Pristina was another distinguishing characteristic 
of the EU mission in Kosovo. Such horizontal tasks included “programming, 
procurement, personnel, training and best practices, human rights and gender 
policies, the anti-corruption unit and the bodies responsible for communication 
and outreach to civil society and NGOs.”27
3. Delegation of foreign policy competences to the EU in the post-
Lisbon era: the 2013 Brussels Agreement
Beyond playing a prime role in Kosovo’s transition, the EU also stood at the forefront 
in brokering talks between Belgrade and Pristina. the effectiveness of the EU’s 
mediation was largely linked to the conditioning of an agreement between Serbia 
and Kosovo to the former’s accession process to the EU. Here too, notwithstanding 
different Member State positions on the recognition of Kosovo and the persisting 
intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon era, the Member 
States delegated to the High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/
Vice President of the commission the task of mediating the normalisation of 
relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
3.1 What basis for negotiation? EU-Kosovo bilateral relations
What emerges from EU-Kosovo bilateral relations is the willingness, shared by the 
vast majority of Member States, for Kosovo to be widely recognised as an independent 
state. Some Member States have worked for the normalisation of relations between 
Pristina and Belgrade through their national diplomatic services and, at times, 
even through their national heads of state and government. As anticipated, the 
non-recognition of Kosovo on behalf of five Member States has not impeded the 
delegation of foreign policy competences on the issue of Kosovo. Shortly after 
Samuel Zgobar, the EU Special representative appointed by the Hr, arrived in 
Kosovo in January 2012, cecilia Malmström, then European commissioner for 
Home Affairs, launched talks that could lead to the lifting of EU visa requirements 
for citizens of Kosovo.28 At that time, Kosovo was the only country in the Western 
Balkans whose citizens still needed visas for short-term visits to the EU’s Schengen 
26 the mission’s mandate has been extended up until 14th June 2016 and the authorised maximum 
strength is now 800 international staff and 800 local staff. For more information on EULEX see, for 
instance, EEAS, EULEX Kosovo. EU rule of law mission in Kosovo, last updated October 2014, http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/factsheet_eulex_kosovo_
en.pdf.
27 Giovanni Grevi, “EULEX Kosovo”, cit, p. 360.
28 toby Vogel, “EU starts visa talks with Kosovo”, in European Voice, 17 January 2012.
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area. Later on in 2012, Greece and Slovakia, although not recognising Kosovo’s 
independence, started accepting passports issued by Pristina. Such recognition 
brings further evidence to the above-mentioned “blame shifting” aspect of the 
delegation of competences from Member States to the commission.
On 10 September 2012 Pieter Feith’s term of office as International civilian 
representative in Kosovo ended. Feith had been appointed by twenty-five 
states, including the US and the majority of EU Member States, to assist Kosovo’s 
government in the implementation of the plan proposed by Marti Ahtisaari. thus, 
the states supporting such mandate declared Kosovo a fully independent state. the 
International Steering Group, the organisation supervising Kosovo’s independence, 
stated that Kosovo had successfully satisfied all the required conditions. the latter 
included the protection of ethnic minorities and decentralisation of power. At the 
ceremonial ending of the international supervision of Kosovo’s independence, 
then-commissioner for Enlargement Stephan Füle declared, for the first time, that 
Kosovo was on the path to eventual membership.29 the underpinning logic of the 
statement was reflected in the 2012 commission’s annual progress report, which 
affirmed that the EU should start talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Kosovo. the non-recognition of five Member States was not considered 
as a legal obstacle to the signing of an SAA, as claimed by the feasibility study for a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo 
launched at the beginning of 2012.30 the official document stated clearly that the 
Union could legally conclude an association agreement with Kosovo, as per Article 
217 and 218 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tFEU). the 
main argument underpinning such argument was that the possibility for the EU 
to conclude international agreements is not restricted to generally recognised 
independent states or international organisations. Furthermore, from a legal 
perspective, the SAA could be concluded in a way that could respect the positions 
of Member States on the status of Kosovo. As the study states: “the legal basis for an 
agreement with Kosovo, does not constitute recognition of Kosovo by the Union 
as an independent state nor does it constitute recognition by individual Member 
States of Kosovo, provided that an express reservation to that effect is made. Equally, 
it does not constitute a reversal of recognition by the Member States which have 
already recognised.”31
3.2 EU role in promoting the Belgrade-Pristina talks
On 22 July 2010 the International court of Justice (IcJ) in the Hague affirmed, 
in a non-binding opinion, that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia 
29 toby Vogel, “Marathon man”, in European Voice, 20 September 2012.
30 European commission, Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between 
the European Union and Kosovo (cOM(2012)602), 10 October 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/tXt/?uri=celex:52012Dc0602.
31 Ibidem, p. 3.
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on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.32 Hr/VP catherine Ashton 
welcomed the IcJ’s judgment without commenting on the five EU Member States 
that still did not recognise Kosovo. “the advisory opinion opens a new phase,” she 
said. “the future of Serbia lies in the European Union. the future of Kosovo also lies 
in the European Union.”33 Indeed, such reference to Serbia’s future was a strategic 
one for, a month before, in June 2010, the EU’s foreign ministers decided to ratify 
the main pre-accession agreement with Serbia. Such a clear connection between 
the normalisation of the status of Kosovo and the enlargement process to Serbia 
was of crucial importance.
Indeed in September 2010, Boris tadić, the President of Serbia, agreed to soften 
the language challenging Kosovo’s independence from a draft resolution Serbia 
had submitted to the United Nations.34 tadić’s shift occurred after discussion with 
Ashton and was considered a major negotiating success for the Hr/VP. Interestingly, 
the issue had been of crucial importance to both William Hague, the UK foreign 
minister, and Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, who had been in 
Belgrade the week before to push Serbia for a change in its draft resolution.
Since Serbia, the original sponsor of the UN resolution, removed the language 
challenging Kosovo’s independence, EU Member States agreed to co-sponsor the 
document, which “welcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a 
process of dialogue between the parties.”35 the resolution called for a new dialogue 
between Belgrade and Pristina and, most interestingly, it welcomed mediation 
efforts by the EU to enhance dialogue between the two. Whilst tadić stressed 
that the removal did not imply a change of Serbia’s position on Kosovo, Kosovo’s 
government affirmed that it was willing to discuss any issue with Belgrade with 
the considerable exception of matters related to its independence. Yet, the co-
sponsored resolution set the basis for talks on technical matters such as trade, 
transport, energy, interconnections and air controls. As a reward, Brussels agreed 
to refer Serbia’s application for membership of the EU to the European commission 
for an opinion.
32 IcJ, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in 
respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
php?p1=3&p2=4&case=141&p3=4.
33 Hr/VP, Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on 
the ICJ advisory opinion (12516/10 Presse 213), 22 July 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
PESc-10-213_en.htm.
34 Hr/VP, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the next steps at the UN 
concerning the advisory opinion on Kosovo (MEMO/10/396), 8 September 2010, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-396_en.htm.
35 UN General Assembly, Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international 
law (A/rES/64/298), 9 September 2010, http://undocs.org/A/rES/64/298. See toby Vogel, “EU and 
Serbia at odds over joint resolution on Kosovo”, in European Voice, 30 September 2010.
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3.3 The beginning of the Belgrade-Pristina talks
In 2011 the involvement of German chancellor Angela Merkel brought further 
impulse to the Belgrade-Pristina talks, which had begun in March of the same year 
under the brokering of the European External Action Service. At that time, it had 
become clear that Serbia would not be accepted as an EU member state unless a 
normalisation of its relationship with Kosovo had taken place.36 Eight rounds of 
technical talks between Serbia and its former province gave birth to agreements 
on freedom of movement, civil registry and recognition of university diplomas, 
customs stamps and the administration of border crossings to Serbia. Although 
it was included among the technical agreements, border crossings was a highly 
politicised subject, particularly considering that in 2011 violence on Kosovo’s 
border had partially hampered the EU-mediated negotiations between Kosovo and 
Serbia.37
In September 2011, Stefan Füle, the European commissioner for Enlargement, 
told Božidar Djelić, Serbia’s deputy prime minister, that a normalisation of Serbia’s 
relations with Kosovo was a requirement for Serbia to advance its request for EU 
membership, but that recognition was not a precondition for joining the EU.38 Shortly 
after, in its annual progress report, the European commission recommended that 
Serbia be recognised as a candidate for EU membership.39 Yet, the annual report 
suggested that whilst recognising Kosovo was not a formal precondition for joining 
the EU, Serbia should, like any aspirant, establish and maintain good relations with 
all its neighbours.
Notwithstanding the European commission’s recommendation on Serbia’s 
candidacy, Germany, supported by Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and the UK 
blocked progress, arguing that Belgrade should have done more, especially on the 
removal of barricades set up by Kosovo Serbs in northern municipalities, and on 
finding a compromise, which would have allowed Kosovo to participate in regional 
institutions. Given the need for unanimity amongst Member States in the granting 
of candidacy, the December 2011 European council rejected Serbia’s bid for 
recognition as a candidate country. Formally, the decision was only postponed40 and 
the Hr/VP and the European commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, Füle, stated they were both “confident” Serbia would be able to soon make 
the final progress to gain such status.41
36 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “L’UE e i Balcani: l’impatto politico dell’Europa in Kosovo (Parte II)”, 
in Gli Euros, 12 May 2013, http://www.glieuros.eu/L-UE-e-i-Balcani-l-impatto,5995.html.
37 Ibidem.
38 toby Vogel, “So near, yet so far”, in European Voice, 6 October 2011.
39 European commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012 (cOM(2011)666), 
12 October 2011, par. 23, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/tXt/?uri=celex:52011Dc0666.
40 European council, European Council Conclusions, 9 December 2011, par. 13, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf. See also toby Vogel, 
“Serbia’s candidate status postponed”, in European Voice, 15 December 2011.
41 European Union, Joint Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for 
IA
I 
W
o
r
k
In
g
 p
A
p
e
r
s
 1
5
 |
 0
1 
- 
J
A
n
u
A
r
y
 2
0
15
12
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
Beyond the Intergovernmental-Supranational Divide 
in EU Foreign Policy: Insights from Kosovo
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
4
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-2
5
-5
3.4 More than a name: Kosovo’s nameplate in diplomatic meetings
Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo were also held in Brussels to find a 
compromise on how reference should be made to Kosovo in international meetings. 
Whilst Serbia wanted to prevent Kosovo’s participation in such meetings unless 
clear reference was made to the United Nations Security council resolution 1244 of 
1999,42 which describes Kosovo as part of Serbia until a final status agreement, Kosovo 
wanted to be represented as the “republic of Kosovo” and therefore considered as 
an independent country. In order to get Kosovo’s compliance, commissioner Füle, 
proposed to begin preparations for a pre-accession agreement between the EU and 
Kosovo.43 In this case as well, the commission took the initiative in light of the 
Member States’ acquiescence.
Under intense diplomatic influence, Kosovo renounced the term “republic” and 
accepted reference to UNScr 1244, as long as a similar reference was going to be 
made to the 2010 advisory opinion of the International court of Justice. the latter 
stated Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 was, in fact, legally 
valid. Kosovo’s nameplate in diplomatic meetings contains now a footnote making 
reference to both UNScr 1244 of 1999 and to the IcJ’s ruling of 2010. According to 
the footnote, the designation “Kosovo”, is “without prejudice to positions on status 
and is in line with UNScr 1244 and the IcJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration 
of Independence.” According to a statement of the council of Ministers, the new 
agreement would allow Kosovo “to participate and sign new agreements on its own 
account and to speak for itself at all regional meetings.”44 Previously, agreements 
regarding Kosovo had been signed by the UNMIK.
the Hr/VP and the commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy 
described the deal as “a major step forward,” arguing that it would allow further 
progress on contractual relations with the EU.45 Along such reasoning, the 
commission proposed to launch a feasibility study for a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement between Kosovo and the EU. Even though the commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission and Stefan Füle, EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy on Serbia (MEMO/11/894), 9 
December 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-894_en.htm.
42 UN Security council, Resolution 1244 (S/rES/1244), 10 June 1999, http://undocs.org/S/
rES/1244(1999).
43 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “L’UE e i Balcani: l’impatto politico dell’Europa in Kosovo (Parte II)”, 
cit.
44 European Union, EU facilitated dialogue: Agreement on Regional Cooperation and IBM technical 
protocol (5455/12 Presse 9), 24 February 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PrES-12-9_
en.htm. See also toby Vogel, “What’s in a name?”, in European Voice, 1 March 2012.
45 European Union, Joint statement of High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and 
Commissioner Štefan Füle on the agreements reached in the latest round of Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue (MEMO/12/133), 24 February 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-133_
en.htm.
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Enlargement effectively has the authority to launch a feasibility study without the 
consent of the five EU member states, which still do not recognize Kosovo, he assured 
through his spokesperson this would not happen without their consent.46 On 28 
February 2012 national ministers for European affairs unanimously recommended 
granting Serbia the status of candidate for EU membership.47 On 1 March 2012 the 
European council, in response, granted such status to Serbia.48
3.5 The 2012 presidential elections
Before elections were held in May 2012, Serbian President, tadić, had agreed to 
exclude Serb-controlled parts of Kosovo from Belgrade’s parliamentary voting.49 
Yet, in the spring of 2012, the Serbian government had pushed to let Serbs in north 
Kosovo cast their vote for local assemblies in Serbia.50 this was, according to Serbian 
authorities an obligation to respect Serbia’s constitution, which defines Kosovo as a 
Serbian province.51 By May, through talks mediated by the European Union, Serbia 
and Kosovo agreed that Serbs living in north Kosovo would have been able to vote 
in Serbia’s general elections under the umbrella of the Organization for Security 
and co-operation in Europe (OScE). EULEX was mandated to control the security 
of the voting. According to the same compromise, Serbs would have not voted in 
Serbian local elections. Kosovo’s government, dominated by ethnic Albanians, in 
fact considers local administrations in the north as “parallel institutions” violating 
Kosovo’s sovereignty.52 In the end, ethnic Serbs in north Kosovo were able to vote 
in the general and presidential elections under the conditions agreed through 
EU mediation. Even though the turnout was very low – around 32 percent – the 
elections proceeded without any major incident.
After the elections were held, Serbia’s new president, Nikolić, told EU leaders that 
he intended to stick to EU mediated deals with Kosovo. However, the new president 
also affirmed he would have to learn the “details” of such agreements before “making 
a final judgement.”53 After a meeting with the new Serbian president, European 
46 toby Vogel, “Serbia and Kosovo strike name deal”, in European Voice, 24 February 2012; toby 
Vogel, “What’s in a name?”, cit.
47 council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Enlargement and the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, 3150th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 28 February 2012, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/genaff/128255.pdf.
48 European council, Serbia is granted EU candidate status (EUcO 35/12 Presse 84), 1 March 2012, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128445.pdf.
49 toby Vogel, “tadic excludes Serb controlled parts of Kosovo from elections”, in European Voice, 
15 March 2012.
50 It should be noted that the Serbian 2012 presidential elections were held in parallel with the 
provincial and local elections.
51 toby Vogel, “tadic excludes Serb controlled parts of Kosovo from elections”, cit.
52 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “L’UE e i Balcani: l’impatto politico dell’Europa in Kosovo (Parte II)”, 
cit.; toby Vogel, “Nationalist wins Serbian election”, in European Voice, 21 May 2012; toby Vogel, 
“Nikolic pledges to implement Kosovo agreements”, in European Voice, 14 June 2012.
53 toby Vogel, “Nationalist wins Serbian election”, cit.; toby Vogel, “Nikolic pledges to implement 
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council President Herman Van rompuy affirmed that the “further normalisation” 
of ties with Kosovo remained a “key requirement” for the start of negotiation. “We 
expect Belgrade to implement the agreements it has entered into in the dialogue 
with Pristina, in particular on regional cooperation and crossing points.”54 In the 
commission’s 2012 annual progress report, the commissioner for Enlargement 
affirmed Serbia should be allowed to open accession talks only if there is “visible 
and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo.”55
3.6 The Brussels Agreement
the brokering of technical talks between Pristina and Belgrade paved the way for 
the two parties to reach the Brussels Agreement in April 2013 under the mediation 
of the EU. Such a deal represents a major development in the stabilisation of the 
northern part of Kosovo. the Serbian communities living in the northern part 
of the former Serbian province will be, from now on, integrated into Kosovo, but 
granted a wide range of autonomy in the fields of police, healthcare, town planning 
and justice. Ideally, such an arrangement would create an ensemble of four Serbian 
municipalities (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić) establishing 
a sort of urban district within Kosovo’s administrative construction.56 In terms 
of security, Kosovar police forces will be deployed in the north. Yet as the forces 
will have to reflect the ethnic composition of that regional setting, the regional 
commander of such security forces will be a Serb.57 Interestingly, both Pristina and 
Belgrade have agreed, as part of the deal, not to hinder their respective efforts to 
become an EU member.
As the 2013 European council on Foreign relations (EcFr) Scorecard highlights,58 
notwithstanding some disorders in Northern Mitrovica during the election for local 
councillors at the end of 2013, the deal reached in April 2013 seemed to have passed 
its first test. Needless to say, Serbian candidates scored major successes among the 
Serbian northern and southern communities.
Kosovo agreements”, cit.
54 European council, Statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, 
following his meeting with President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić (EUcO 116/12 Presse 268), 14 June 
2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/130978.pdf.
55 European commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report (SWD(2012)333), 10 October 2012, p. 19, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/tXt/?uri=celex:52012Sc0333.
56 See, for instance, South East European Studies at Oxford, Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels 
Agreements and Beyond, Workshop report, March 2014, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/seesox/
publications/SerbiaKosovoWorkshopreport.pdf.
57 Piotr Smolar, “Serbia and Kosovo sign historic agreement”, in The Guardian, 30 April 2013, http://
gu.com/p/3fdzb.
58 European council for Foreign relations (EcFr), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013, http://
www.ecfr.eu/scorecard.
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the normalisation process is linked to progress on EU enlargement. the European 
council rewarded Belgrade for the deal with Kosovo by taking a conditional decision 
to open membership talks by January 2014. the EU offered Kosovo, in turn, the 
opportunity to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
which was successfully concluded in 2014.59 What emerges from such events is 
that, even in this last case, notwithstanding divisions among Member States on 
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the EU managed, as a whole and in an 
integrated manner, to foster the stabilisation of relations between the two parties. 
this was done linking the conclusion of the Brussels Agreement to the launch of 
negotiations for a SAA with Kosovo. Indeed, notwithstanding the divisions among 
Member States on Kosovo’s independence such launch was legally feasible. As 
mentioned above, the Lisbon treaty allows the EU to conclude an SAA without the 
agreement of all Member States.
Analysing the effectiveness of the agreement goes beyond the focus of this paper. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that, more than a year after the agreement was 
concluded, in a report presented to show the progress in the implementation of 
the Brussels deal, Edita tahiri, acting deputy prime minister of Kosovo and head of 
the delegation to the EU mediated talks, strongly accused the Serb side of constant 
intervention in Kosovo’s internal affairs. Among the tensions between the two 
parties, disorders in the north of Mitrovica at the beginning of June 2014 have 
brought back to the spotlight the issue of barricades on the Iber river. What appears 
relevant for this analysis is that such criticisms were issued while acknowledging 
the undeniable progress made through the EU mediated talks.60
conclusions
Only 22 EU member states have recognised Kosovo so far. Still, the EU has managed 
to have significant political impact and act in a truly integrated way in Kosovo, 
especially through the brokering of talks between Belgrade and Pristina and the 
linking of Serbia’s accession to the EU to the normalisation of the relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo.
Despite the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy, this success was not 
only the result of strong efforts by key Member States, such as Austria, Germany, 
Italy and the UK. the European commission and the EEAS played a pivotal role 
in such progress. A general agreement between Member States and institutions 
exists on the fact that the Balkans should be part of the Union in the near future 
and that enlargement should be the main EU policy to be used towards them. 
thanks to such alignment of preferences, the institutional separation between 
59 EEAS, Stabilisation and Association Agreement successfully completed, 2 May 2014, http://eeas.
europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140502_03_en.htm.
60 Elton tota, “Dialogue. Serbia doesn’t implement the agreements reached with Kosovo”, in 
Independent Balkan News Agency, 14 October 2014, http://wp.me/p3kkVt-8zG.
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an intergovernmental and a supernational Union were overcome. A consensus 
on the European integration of the Balkans, including Kosovo, is particularly 
interesting considering the non-recognition of Kosovo by several Member States. 
Notwithstanding this potential cleavage, in practice, Member States have agreed to 
delegate to the commission and the High representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy in view of their general alignment of preferences regarding the 
normalisation of ties between Kosovo and Serbia.
As risk-adverse actors, Member States delegated to the commission to reduce the 
amount of work on technically complex issues, particularly in the initial post-
reconstruction phases in Kosovo. On that occasion Member States strongly relied 
on the commission’s technical expertise. thereafter, the Member States have 
agreed to link the prospects of European integration of both Serbia and Kosovo 
to the normalisation of relations between the two. In addition, the five non-
recognisers have been ready to delegate to EU institutions as a result of a “blame-
shifting” attitude. Delegating to the EU institutions enabled them to support the 
stabilisation of the Balkans without having to concede recognition of Kosovo and 
face the implications this might have with their own secessionist movements. 
Notwithstanding the intergovernmentalism of EU foreign policy and the apparent 
cleavages between Member States, the case of Kosovo highlights how integration 
as well as effectiveness in the foreign policy domain is still possible.
Updated 9 January 2015
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